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Abstract
It is widely believed that competitive elections are required for good democratic perfor-
mance. Many races, however, see little electoral competition, due to asymmetries in voters’
evaluation of candidates’ quality (due, for example, to incumbency) and party labels (due, for
example, to ideology). We study the consequences of both types of imbalances in a unified
theoretical framework building on the notion that voters are rationally ignorant and need to
pay costly attention to learn about candidates. Our paper rationalizes key empirical regu-
larities such as the existence of large incumbency spending and electoral advantages or the
heterogeneous effect of incumbency. Further, we highlight that properly accounting for voter
attention is critical to interpreting empirical estimates of key determinants of electoral success,
the sources of the incumbency advantage, and the causal effect of incumbency status. We also
show that while depressing electoral competition, imbalances nonetheless improve voter wel-
fare.
Keywords: Electoral Imbalances, Incumbency Advantage, Electoral Campaigns.
Supplementary material for this article is available in the appendix in the online edition.
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The good functioning of democracy, it is widely believed, requires competitive elections (e.g.,
Schumpeter, 1942). In practice, however, many electoral races experience little competition. In-
cumbents, for instance, tend to enjoy large margins of victory (see Figure 1a for the U.S. House) and
high probabilities of reelection across a wide spectrum of offices and political systems.1 Even open
races often result in lopsided elections. In U.S. House elections between 1968 and 2014, the average
elected candidate won the two-party vote (Republican v Democrat) by more than 13% (Figure 1b).
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(b) Elected candidate’s margin in open races
Figure 1: Winning margins in House of Represenative elections in the U.S.
Winning margin is defined as the two-party share of the winning candidate minus 50. For details on the construction
of these figures, see Supplemental Appendix H.
Scholars have devoted considerable attention to understanding why elections are so rarely com-
petitive. Overall, two key empirical findings emerge. First, asymmetry in voters’ opinions of
candidates—for instance due to a candidate’s incumbency—translates into a sizeable electoral ad-
vantage (e.g., Gelman and King, 1990; Cox and Morgenstern, 1993; Ansolabehere et al., 2000). Sec-
ond, the impact of asymmetry in the voters’ evaluations of party labels is more moderate. Greater
partisan alignment between a candidate and the electorate carries electoral benefits, but their mag-
nitude is limited, as evident from aggregate-level analysis using redistricting (e.g., Abramowitz,
1The electoral advantage enjoyed by incumbents has been documented at all levels in the U.S.
(Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002) as well as in Japan (Hayama, 1992; Shin, 2011), the U.K. (Katz
and King, 1999), and Australia (Horiuchi and Leigh, 2009).
3
1983; Niemi and Winsky, 1992; Gelman and King, 1994). While the literature has established
several stylized facts, important questions remain unanswered. How do these well-documented
asymmetries produce an electoral advantage? What are their consequences for voter welfare? Do
different types of asymmetries produce different effects? How do these asymmetries interact with
other dimensions of heterogeneity among candidates, such as campaign funds?
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to assess the consequences of ex-ante electoral
asymmetries. Unlike previous theories which focus almost exclusively on candidates’ behavior,
our work builds on the idea that the electorate is ‘rationally ignorant’ (Downs, 1957; Page and
Shapiro, 1992). Voters must pay costly attention during campaigns to learn about candidates (as
in Prato and Wolton, 2016a). We study how voters’ strategic choice of attention and the resulting
electoral outcomes are shaped by reputational imbalance—defined as the electorate’s higher ex-ante
evaluation of a candidate’s quality—and partisan imbalance—defined as a higher ex-ante evaluation
of a candidate’s party label.
We find that electoral campaigns exacerbate reputational imbalance generating a sizeable elec-
toral advantage, but mitigate partisan imbalance leading to a positive but limited electoral benefit,
in line with the broad patterns documented in the empirical literature. Our framework also helps to
organize and explain a host of established empirical facts such as the incumbency spending advan-
tage or heterogeneity in the incumbency advantage across different types of office and district. We
further show that researchers need to account for voter attention when interpreting estimates of the
main determinants of electoral outcomes (such as candidates’ quality or experience), the sources of
the incumbency advantage, or regression discontinuity estimates of the causal effect of incumbency
status.
Our baseline model features a representative voter (to whom we reserve the pronoun ‘she’) and
two candidates (1 and 2). A candidate is either ‘congruent’ or a ‘party loyalist,’ and his type is his
private information. The voter prefers congruent politicians who always provide a high payoff and
holds initially a higher opinion of candidate 1 (for example, due to his status as incumbent). The
voter’s payoff from a party loyalist depends on her evaluation of the candidate’s party label, modeled
as a ‘partisan swing’ which is more likely to favor candidate 1 (e.g., the voter leans Democrat).
Absent additional information, the voter always follows the partisan swing. However, during the
electoral campaign, the voter can learn candidates’ types. As in Prato and Wolton (2016a), electoral
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communication requires attention by the voter and campaign expenditures by the candidate. In
addition, we suppose that candidate 1 is more effective (all else equals) at reaching the voter (e.g.,
due to franking privileges). Attention and expenditures are complement and positively correlated
with the probability of learning the candidate’s type.
Candidates engage in informative campaign expenditures only if they expect the voter to pay
attention to their message. As such, there always exists an uninformative equilibrium with no
information revelation. Informative campaigns, however, always yield higher voter welfare. Voter’s
choice of attention depends on the probability of an ‘electoral mistake’—electing a party loyalist on
the basis of the partisan swing when a congruent candidate is in the race—that is affected in subtle
ways by electoral imbalances.
In the case of reputational imbalance, the leading candidate 1 is more likely to be congruent
compared to the trailing candidate 2. Since the partisan swing is unrelated to candidate-specific
characteristics, the voter can make two electoral mistakes: she can fail to identify a congruent
candidate 1 and elect a loyalist candidate 2 based on the partisan swing, or she can fail to identify
a congruent candidate 2 and elect a loyalist candidate 1 again based on the partisan swing. Due
to reputational imbalance, failing to elect a congruent candidate 1 is more likely, and the voter
thus pays more attention to the leading candidate 1. Anticipating a more attentive electorate, and
thus a higher return on campaign expenditures, candidate 1 outspends candidate 2. Consequently,
the voter is always more likely to learn candidate 1’s type. This is the exacerbating effect of the
electoral campaign: modest levels of reputational imbalance bring about an attention and spending
advantage, which generate a sizeable electoral advantage for the leading candidate.
These results help to organize empirical evidence on the sources of the incumbency advantage—
i.e., the increase in winning probability that a candidate enjoys when running as an incumbent with
better reputation (as documented by Carson et al., 2007; Hirano and Snyder, 2009) compared to
competing in an open race. They provide a rationale for why the incumbency advantage cannot
be fully explained by incumbents’ higher quality (see Erikson and Titiunik, 2015; Hall and Snyder,
2015) and spending advantage (see Gerber, 1998). In our framework, a significant part of the
incumbency advantage is caused by the incumbent’s attention advantage.
Further, our conclusions indicate that estimates of the marginal effect of key determinants of
electoral outcomes such as candidate quality and campaign spending are upwardly biased when
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researchers fail to account for the mediating effect of voter attention. Only ‘equilibrium effects’—
which do not distinguish between direct and mediating effects—can be properly identified.
Finally, our findings offer a novel way to assess recent estimates of the incumbency status
advantage (the causal effect of incumbency status on electoral success) using regression discontinuity
(RD) designs. The incumbency status advantage can be assimilated to the leading candidate 1’s
higher communication effectiveness (due, e.g., to franking privileges, media exposure). We show
that even if RD designs completely parse out reputational imbalance, these estimates would still
include the incumbent’s attention advantage. As such, RD designs cannot identify the direct causal
effect of holding office.
Turning now to partisan imbalance, the voter’s most likely electoral mistake in this case is to
wrongly elect a loyalist candidate 1, since the partisan swing favors him with high probability. Other
things equal (e.g., reputational imbalance, communication effectiveness), the voter then pays more
attention to the trailing candidate 2, who then engages in greater campaign spending. The voter is
thus more likely to learn the trailing candidate 2’s platform, and the electoral benefit generated by
partisan imbalance is limited. This is the mitigating effect of electoral campaign.
Due to the mitigating effect, the leading candidate 1’s electoral gain is smaller than the underly-
ing level of partisan imbalance, albeit always positive. This result, we show, implies two interesting
comparative statics: (i) incumbents’ vote share increase with the partisan alignment between them
and their constituents, but (ii) incumbents’ personal vote (i.e., the fraction of their vote explained
by their reputation) is higher in district whose partisanship leans towards the other party. Both
are consistent with empirical patterns uncovered in Ansolabehere et al. (2000).
Our paper also challenges the widely held belief that more electoral competition always benefits
a moderate median voter concerned about selecting high-quality candidates. Both reputational and
partisan imbalances decrease electoral competition by improving the standing of the leading can-
didate. However, imbalances always increase the (ex-ante) probability that a congruent politician
is elected. A decline in electoral competition can thus increase the performance of the electoral
process. We obtain a similar result for the incumbency status advantage. Greater communication
effectiveness by the leading candidate increases voter welfare even if the trailing candidate becomes
correspondingly less effective at reaching the voter. The incumbency status may well be an un-
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fair advantage for a candidate (Fiorina, 1977), but an instrumentally beneficial advantage for the
electorate.
1 Formal literature on electoral imbalances
Most existing formal contributions on electoral imbalances examine the source of the incumbency
advantage. Specifically, existing contributions show how the incumbency advantage can originate
from selection effects and the scare-off of talented challengers (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita,
2008)2 or risk aversion on the part of voters who value incumbents’ existing record over challengers’
untested abilities (Bernhardt and Ingerman, 1985). Others have analyzed how the incumbency
advantage varies with the nature of the voter’s screening problem (Kartik and Van Weelden, 2015) or
the intrinsic quality of the incumbent (Gordon and Landa, 2009). None of these articles incorporate
campaign expenditures, and thus cannot explain the incumbency spending advantage. While a few
models with persuasive electoral advertising can link incumbents’ greater ability to raise campaign
funds to a sizable electoral advantage (Meirowitz, 2008; Pastine and Pastine, 2012), our paper
is unique in explaining the incumbency spending advantage in an environment with informative
electoral advertising and no competitive edge in fund-raising.
Fewer theoretical contributions analyze the consequence of partisan imbalance in a non-spatial
setting.3 Among those, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006) study a legislator’s allocation of
effort between policy-making and constituency service. As in our paper, partisan imbalance can
benefit the voter by increasing the provision of constituency service. They do not consider, however,
the consequences of partisan imbalance on electoral outcomes.
2Despite initially favorable evidence (Cox and Katz , 1996; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997), the
empirical importance of the scare-off has recently been called into question by Hall and Snyder
(2015).
3It is well known that in a Downsian framework, partisan imbalance can induce candidates to
take more extreme positions (Wittman, 1983; Bernhardt and Ingerman, 1985; Groseclose, 2001;
Aragone´s and Palfrey, 2002).
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Existing papers almost exclusively consider only one type of imbalance in isolation4 and focus on
candidates’ incentives, limiting voters’ role to casting a vote. In turn, our paper provides a unified
framework and explicitly considers voters’ strategic choice of attention. Following Dewatripont and
Tirole (2005) and Hafer and Landa (2007), in our model, receivers’ information is endogenous to
their attention and to senders’ communication effort. While Prato and Wolton (2016a) are the
first to adapt this modeling approach to electoral campaigns, their analysis of the relationship
between voter interest in politics and attention to campaigns assumes perfect symmetry between
candidates, and is thus completely silent about the role of electoral imbalances, as well as the
resulting empirical implications. Other models of electoral campaigns are unidirectional: with either
candidates informing voters (e.g., Prat, 2002; Coate, 2004; Ashworth, 2006; Dewan and Hortala-
Vallve, 2016; Prato and Wolton, 2016b) or voters learning about candidates (e.g., Martinelli, 2006;
Svolik, 2013; Hortala-Vallve and Larcinese, 2016).
2 The model
We analyze a one-period, three-player game with two candidates (1 and 2, from party 1 and 2,
respectively) and a representative voter. Candidates compete for an elected office which they value.
Before the campaign, each candidate j ∈ {1, 2} privately observes his type tj ∈ {c, l}, where c stands
for congruent and l for party loyalist. The commonly known ex-ante probability that candidate j is
congruent is qj. At the end of the campaign, the voter elects one of the two candidates (e ∈ {1, 2}).
The voter does not know candidates’ type, but can learn it during the electoral campaign (for
evidence that campaigns are informative, see Alvarez, 1997, and Peterson, 2009). The likelihood
that the voter learns candidate j’s type tj depends on her attention to j’s campaign (xj), as well as
j’s informative campaign expenditures (yj). Both spending and attention are costly. For candidate
j, the cost corresponds to the forgone alternative uses of his “war chest” (Schuster, 2016), and
the time devoted to fund-raising for political advertising or attending campaign meetings with
constituents; it is parametrized by the function C(y) = y2+λ/(2 + λ), λ > 0. For the voter,
the cost captures cognitive constraints, the forgone benefit of alternative use of her time, and more
4Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) is an exception, but the authors limit their analysis
to the effect of partisan imbalance on selection and the trailing candidate’s electoral fortune.
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generally, the well documented “drive for cognitive economy” displayed by humans when performing
a variety of intellectual tasks (Allport, 1954; McGure et al. 2010); it is parametrized by the function
Cv(xj) = x
2+λ
j /(2 + λ).
5 The probability that the voter learns candidate j’s type at the end of the
campaign is
ρjxjyj,
where the communication effectiveness ρj ∈ (0, 1] captures additional sources of variation in the
strength of a campaign (such the availability of franking privileges or the effective use of social
media).
The voter obtains a payoff of 1 when the elected politician is congruent. When the elected
politician is a loyalist, the voter’s payoff is uv(θ, e), where θ is a partisan swing affecting the voter’s
evaluation of party labels.6 The partisan swing θ is realized after the electoral campaign, but before
the voter’s electoral decision (as in many formulations of the probabilistic voting models—e.g.,
Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). For ease of exposition and tractability, we assume that the swing
favors either candidate 1 or candidate 2. We thus suppose that θ ∈ {1, 2} and uv(1, 1) = uv(2, 2) =
ξ > 0, while uv(1, 2) = uv(2, 1) = 0. It is common knowledge that Pr(θ = j) = pij, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Throughout, we assume that the voter prefers congruence over party loyalty (ξ < 1), but absent
any additional information, her preferences over party labels drive her comparative assessment of
candidates (ξ > q1).
7 The voter’s utility also includes the cost of attention (x1 and x2) described
above and assumes the following form (with I{te=c} the indicator function equals 1 if the elected
politician is congruent):
Uv(e, x1, x2) = I{te=c} +
(
1− I{te=c}
)
uv(θ, e)− Cv(x1)− Cv(x2) (1)
5The choice of a specific cost function is for simplicity: most of our results carry through under
more general assumptions. In the Appendix, we prove Proposition 1 as well as several of our other
main results (e.g., Properties RI.1-RI.3) under more general assumptions.
6For a similar formulation of the voter’s payoffs, albeit with a different justification, see Galasso
and Nannicini (2011).
7The last inequality is only a sufficient condition for all our results to carry through. A necessary
condition is that the voter always bases her electoral decision on the payoff from the partisan swing
uv(θ, j) when she does not learn candidates’ type.
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A candidate’s payoffs are normalized to 0 when out of office and 1 when in office. As described
above, candidate j ∈ {1, 2} can also incur costly campaign expenditures (yj) to inform the voter.
Candidate j’s utility can thus be expressed as:
Uj(yj) = I{e=j} − C(yj) (2)
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature draws candidates’ types (t1, t2) ∈ {c, l}2, each privately observed.
2. The electoral campaign takes place. Candidates 1 and 2 and the voter choose, respectively,
campaign expenditures and attention y1, y2, and (x1, x2). With probability ρjxjyj, the voter
observes candidate j’s type, otherwise she does not learn anything.
3. The partisan swing θ ∈ {1, 2} is realized, and the voter elects candidates e ∈ {1, 2}.
4. The game ends and payoffs are realized.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). We assume that the voter
tosses a fair coin when indifferent (see the Appendix for a formal definition).
Finally, we define reputational and partisan imbalances as follows. Reputational imbalance
corresponds to the voter’s a priori favorable evaluation of one candidate over the other. We thus
assume q1 =
1+φ
2
and q2 =
1−φ
2
so φ ≥ 0 measures the level of reputational imbalance in favor of
candidate 1.8 Partisan imbalance corresponds to the voter’s a priori favorable evaluation of one
candidate’s party label over the other. Hence, we assume pi1 =
1+δ
2
and pi2 =
1−δ
2
, so δ ≥ 0 measures
the level of partisan imbalance in favor of party 1. We also assume that candidate 1’s communication
is no less effective than his opponent’s: ρ1 ≥ ρ2. Consistently with these assumptions, throughout
we refer to candidate 1 as the leading candidate and his opponent (2) as the trailing candidate.
Discussion
Our model’s main assumption is that swing voters are uncertain about their representative’s will-
ingness to put their interest ahead of party consideration. Absent information about candidates’
8All our results hold for q1 = q + φ/2 for q not too large (but strictly greater than 1/2).
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characteristics, they rely on party cues and evaluate candidates based on how how well they believe
the candidate’s party will be able to promote their interests.
Several factors can generate reputational imbalance: seniority, leadership status, prior personal
and professional accomplishments, or endorsements by celebrities (cf. Garthwaite and Moore, 2013).
A well-studied source of reputational imbalance is a candidate’s incumbency status. Due to selection
(Zaller, 1998; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2008) and other effects, incumbents tend to be
more productive and of higher quality than challengers (Erikson, 1971; Carson et al., 2007; Cox
and Katz, 1996; Hirano and Snyder, 2009).
In contrast, partisan imbalance arises from the fact that parties are informative labels (Downs,
1957; Aldrich, 1995; Snyder and Ting, 2002) associated with well-defined policy positions on certain
issues. Absent any candidate-specific knowledge, a party affiliation is likely to predict a candidate’s
position on (for example) gun controls, reproductive rights, funding of religious education, or min-
imum wage. The function uv(θ, j) thus corresponds the voter’s payoff from the policy bundle
traditionally associated with party j ∈ {1, 2}. Crucially, the electoral appeal of these policy bun-
dles is (i) largely beyond candidates’ control and (ii) partially—but not fully—anticipated, in light
of voters’ partisan leaning (e.g., due to the partisan composition of the candidates’ constituency).
Our approach to electoral campaigns has five important features. First, in line with the concept
of rational ignorance (e.g., Downs, 1957), the voter needs to pay costly attention to become informed.
Second, campaign spending facilitates information acquisition by increasing the effectiveness of voter
attention (that is, voter attention and candidates’ campaign expenditures are complement). Third,
the voter can pay a different level of attention to each candidate. Fourth, the voter does not observe
the level of campaign expenditures. Fifth, a potentially large electorate is modeled as a unique agent,
thereby abstracting from coordination issues and free-riding in information acquisition.
Only the first feature is crucial. While in the baseline model we focus exclusively on informative
expenditures, Appendix G.1 illustrates that the model’s key results continue to hold in an environ-
ment with persuasive campaign spending (i.e., where some impressionable voters can be directly
swayed by expenditures). Our main insights are also immune to assuming weaker forms of comple-
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mentarity between spending and attention.9 Moreover, the paper’s key findings continue to hold
in a model in which learning is not fully directed and paying attention to candidate j’s campaign
is also informative about his opponent −j (see Appendix G.2 for more details). Our model can
easily be extended to the voter observing whether candidates have incurred some (minimum) level
of expenditures (the extensive margin) as long as she does not learn the total amount spent (the
intensive margin) consistently with reporting requirement in the United States.10 Finally, Prato
and Wolton (2016a) show that the assumption of a representative voter plays no substantive role
(despite the possibility of free-riding in a large electorate).
3 Preliminary results
The voter’s preference for congruent politician over party loyalist for all values of the partisan
swing implies that a party loyalist cannot improve his electoral chances when he advertises his type.
Consequently, in equilibrium only congruent candidates incur informative campaign expenditures.
This result, it should be noted, follows from the stark assumption that campaign spending is purely
informative. In Appendix G.1, we study a framework in which a candidate’s spending also “sways”
voters in his favor. Both types then incur strictly positive campaign expenditures, with congruent
types outspending party loyalists.11
Voter attention, in turn, is driven by the possibility of detecting a congruent candidate. Due
to the complementarity in the probability that the voter learns a candidate’s type, there always
exists an ’uninformative equilibrium’ in which candidates never incur any informative expenditures
and the voter pays no attention to the campaign. In this equilibrium, the voter always chooses a
candidate based on the partisan swing. This equilibrium, however, is dominated in terms of voter
9Even under the extreme assumption of no complementarity—that is, the probability of learning
is ρj(xj + yj), most of our results would go through, with the important exception of the spending
advantage under pure reputational advantage.
10For example, candidates’ expenditures between October 20 and November 28, 2016 were re-
ported to the FEC on December, 8 2016.
11Somewhat consistent with this prediction, Prato and Wolton (2016b) shows a positive empirical
correlation between advertising and the provision of outlays to a legislator’s district.
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welfare by an ‘informative equilibrium’ in which both candidates’ spending when congruent and
voter attention are strictly positive. In what follows, we detail the property of the informative
equilibrium.12
Our first result characterizes the voter’s choice of attention and candidates’ campaign expendi-
tures in the informative equilibrium for all levels of reputational (φ) and partisan (δ) imbalances.
Proposition 1. There always exists an informative equilibrium which is unique. In this equilibrium,
(i) loyalist candidates do not incur campaign expenditure: y∗j (l) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2}
(ii) congruent candidates’ campaign expenditures and the voter’s levels of attention are determined
by the unique solution to the following system of equations:
y∗1(c)
1+λ = ρ1
[
1− δ + 1−φ
2
δ
2
y∗2(c)x
∗
2
]
2
x∗1 (3)
y∗2(c)
1+λ = ρ2
[
1 + δ − 1+φ
2
δ
2
y∗1(c)x
∗
1
]
2
x∗2 (4)
(x∗1)
1+λ = ρ1
(
1 + φ
2
)2
1− δ
2
(1− ξ)y∗1(c) (5)
(x∗2)
1+λ = ρ2
(
1− φ
2
)2
1 + δ
2
(1− ξ)y∗2(c), (6)
Proof. All proofs are in the Online Appendix.
While a party loyalist does not incur campaign expenditures, a congruent candidate equalizes
the marginal cost of spending (C ′(y∗j (c)) = y
∗
j (c)
1+λ, j ∈ {1, 2}) with the marginal benefit. The
marginal benefit corresponds to the increase in the probability that the voter learns his type and
elects him (taking into account that she might also learn his opponent’s).
Voter attention towards candidate j ∈ {1, 2} equates marginal cost (C ′v(x∗j) = (x∗j)1+λ) to
marginal benefit, which captures the gain from avoiding an electoral mistake and can be decomposed
as follows:
12There also exist “semi-informative equilibria” in which only one candidate incurs informative
campaign expenditures. All our comparative statics on the behavior of voter and the candidate
engaged in communication hold in these equilibria (see the Appendix). Our focus on the (fully) in-
formative equilibrium guarantees that primitive asymmetries among candidates, rather than asym-
metries induced by equilibrium selection, are driving our results.
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• the probability of having a meaningful electoral choice. That is, j and only j is congruent
(probability qj(1− q−j), with q1 = 1+φ2 = 1− q2);
• the probability of choosing the wrong candidate when uninformed, which is determined by
the partisan swing (probability pi−j, with pi1 = 1+δ2 = 1− pi2);13
• the payoff gain from detecting a congruent candidate over following the partisan swing (1−ξ).
The first and second terms, which depend on reputational and partisan imbalances, play a critical
role in the analysis to which we now turn.
4 The consequences of reputational imbalance
In this section, we study the effect of reputational imbalance, fixing the level of partisan imbalance
to zero (δ = 0, which implies pi1 = pi2 = 1/2) and unless otherwise specified, keeping campaign
effectiveness constant. We first establish our main comparative statics and then discuss their positive
and normative implications.
4.1 Voter attention, candidate spending, and electoral outcomes
Our first three results detail the impact of reputational imbalance on voter attention, campaign
spending, and electoral outcomes.
Property RI.1. The voter pays more attention to the leading candidate 1 than to the trailing
candidate 2: x∗1 − x∗2 > 0. This difference is strictly increasing with reputational imbalance.
Property RI.2. The leading candidate 1 incurs higher campaign expenditures than the trailing
candidate 2: y∗1(c)− y∗2(c) > 0. This difference is strictly increasing with reputational imbalance.
Property RI.3. The leading candidate 1’s (ex-ante) winning probability is strictly greater than
1/2, and strictly increasing with reputational imbalance.
13Under our assumption that the partisan swing is sufficiently large (ξ > q1 ⇔ φ < 2ξ − 1),
the voter always elects the candidate favored by the partisan swing when she does not learn any
candidate’s platform.
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As explained above, the voter pays attention to avoid an electoral mistake: electing a loyalist
candidate j ∈ {1, 2} when his opponent is congruent. Since candidate 1 is more likely to be
congruent than candidate 2, the most likely electoral mistake is to fail to elect a congruent candidate
1. The voter thus pays more attention to the leading candidate 1 who benefits from an ‘attention
advantage’ (Property RI.1).
Since voter attention increases the return on campaign spending, due to his attention advantage,
the leading candidate 1 outspends the trailing candidate 2. The leading candidate thus also enjoys
a spending advantage (Property RI.2 and Figure 2a).14
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with reputational imbalance
The plain dark (dashed blue) line corresponds to the leading (trailing) candidate’s equilibrium expenditures (Figure
2a) and ex-ante winning probability (Figure 2b). Parameter values: ξ = 3/4, λ = 3.
By the previous reasoning, the leading candidate is more likely to win than the trailing candidate
for three reasons (abstracting for now from asymmetries in campaign effectiveness): (i) he is more
likely to be congruent, and the voter is more likely to detect a congruent candidate 1 due to (ii) the
14Since reputational imbalance has opposite effects on the leading and trailing candidates’ spend-
ing, it is a priori unclear how total campaign expenditures vary with φ. In Lemma C.2 in the
Appendix, we show that, in line with empirical evidence, campaign expenditures are highest in
ex-ante competitive races (that is, races with little or no reputational imbalance) whenever the
cost function C(·) is sufficiently convex (so 1’s campaign expenditures do not increase too fast as φ
increases).
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attention and (iii) spending advantages. The electoral campaign has an exacerbating effect—(ii)
and (iii)—which translates reputational imbalance into a significant electoral advantage (Property
RI.3 and Figure 2b).
As noted above, the leading candidate can be understood as the incumbent. Further, following
the definition advanced by Erikson (1971), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2008) or Hirano and
Snyder (2009), we can relate the ‘incumbency advantage’ to the expected difference between the
probability that candidate j wins the election as an incumbent (i.e., φ > 0) and the probability
he wins an open seat election (i.e., φ = 0). Properties RI.1-RI.3 are then consistent with several
important empirical findings: (i) the incumbency spending advantage (Green and Krasno, 1990;
Jacobson, 1990; Gerber, 1998),15 (ii) the positive correlation between incumbent’s quality (here
congruence) and the incumbency advantage (Carson et al., 2007), (iii) the positive correlation
between campaign effort and reputation shocks (Bidwell et al., 2016).
An important contribution of this paper is to clarify the various mechanisms explaining these
empirical patterns. While candidate’s quality plays a critical role, it is not the unique channel.
Higher (expected) congruence only explains part of candidate 1’s electoral advantage. Indeed, the
exacerbating effect of campaigns has a significant impact on his winning probability (compare in
Figure 3a the top solid line representing the equilibrium winning probability and the bottom dashed
line representing the counterfactual winning probability absent the exacerbating effect). While the
need of accounting for quality differences has long been recognized, our theory rationalizes empirical
evidence that the incumbency advantage cannot be fully explained by incumbents’ better reputation
(Hall and Snyder, 2015; Erikson and Titiunik, 2015).
Indeed, reputational imbalance is exacerbated by the spending advantage (even absent a fund-
raising edge to the incumbent) and our newly discovered attention advantage. To illustrate the
relative impact of these two channels, we decompose in Figure 3b the exacerbating effect into
spending and attention advantages.16 Figure 3b suggests that the exacerbating effect of campaign is
15While measures of incumbent spending advantage consider total campaign expenditures, Schus-
ter (2016) shows that this advantage is still present when restricting the sample to advertising
expenditures.
16Due to the complementarity in communication, our counter-factual analysis is only a close
approximation of a decomposition.
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Figure 3: Counterfactual analysis
The dark solid line corresponds to the leading candidate’s ex-ante equilibrium winning probability. The long-dashed
purple line corresponds to candidate 1’s winning probability when campaign expenditures and attention are left at
their no imbalance level (φ = 0). The dashed blue line corresponds to candidate 1’s winning probability when voter’s
levels of attention are held constant at their no imbalance level. The dotted red line corresponds to his winning
probability when campaign expenditures are held constant at their no imbalance level. Parameter values: ξ = 3/4,
λ = 3.
caused in a significant part by the leading candidate’s attention advantage rather than his spending
advantage. The next property formally establishes that the attention advantage is “large,” in the
sense that it always dominates the spending advantage. To understand this result, observe that voter
attention directly depends on reputational imbalance, whereas campaign expenditures depend on φ
only through voter attention.17 As a result, candidates’ campaign expenditures are less responsive
to reputational imbalance than voter attention.
Property RI.4. The effect of candidate 1’s greater campaign expenditures on his winning probability
is strictly lower than the effect of greater level of attention towards him.
By highlighting the role of voter attention, our theory also generates new predictions regarding
the size of the incumbency advantage in different environments: Fixing an incumbent’s reputa-
tion (φ), as communication effectiveness increases, both the attention and incumbency advantages
increase.
17Absent partisan imbalance (δ = 0), congruent candidates’ marginal benefit of campaign expen-
ditures only depends on reputational imbalance through voter attention: Equation 3 and Equation 4
become y∗j (c)
1+λ =
x∗j
2
, j ∈ {1, 2}.
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Property RI.5. Suppose ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ. As communication effectiveness (ρ) increases, equilibrium
voter attention and incumbency advantage increase.
To perform a prima facie assessment of Property RI.4, we consider the relationship between news
coverage (mentions in media outlets) and the size of the incumbency advantage for various elected
offices in the United States.18 Differences in coverage can be a function of greater communication
effectiveness (e.g., media congruence as in Snyder and Stro¨mberg, 2010) or greater attention (e.g.,
higher demand for news) and the coarseness of the data does not allow to distinguish between the
two. However, Property RI.4 shows that the particular mechanism matters little for our theoretical
prediction. As Figure 4 illustrates, we observe a positive correlation between news mention and
incumbency advantage.
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Figure 4: Incumbency Advantage and News Coverage
Data cover 18 states over the period 1990-2000. The solid line corresponds to the fitted regression line. The offices
included in the analysis are: Attorney General (AG), Auditor (AUD), Corporation Commissioner (CRP), Education
Commissioner (EDU), Governor (GOV), Insurance Commissioner (INS), Lieutenant Governor (LTG), Public Utility
Commissioner (PUC), Regent (REGENT), Senator (SEN), Secretary of State (SEC), and Treasurer (TRS). For more
details on the construction of this figure, see Appendix H.
18To perform this preliminary test, we use data kindly provided by Jim Snyder.
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4.2 Implications for empirical research on incumbency
The critical role played by voter attention as highlighted in Property RI.4 has important impli-
cations for both the estimation of the incumbency advantage as well as the identification of the
various mechanisms which can produce it. To measure the incumbency advantage, researchers have
generally tried to estimate the following model, with minor variations meant to overcome limitations
in data availability (see the major contributions by Green and Krasno, 1988; Gelman and King,
1990; Cox and Katz, 1996; Carson et al., 2007).19
V = β0 + β1Quality + β2Money + β3Incumbent+ η, (7)
where V is a candidate’s vote share, Quality is a proxy for his perceived quality, Money is his
campaign spending, and Incumbent is a dummy equal to one if the candidate is an incumbent.
To relate this procedure to our model, we interpret candidate 1’s ex-ante winning probability (i.e.,
before candidates 1 and 2’s types have been realized) as the theoretical proxy of observed vote
shares (in our set-up with a representative voter, realized vote share is always zero or one).
Our theory identifies two issues for estimates based on Equation 7: (i) the absence of a proxy
for attention and (ii) the inclusion of Money. First, by Properties RI.1 and RI.2, the effect of
voter attention is incorrectly attributed to either Money or Incumbent. Property RI.4 suggests
that this omitted variable bias can be quite large and affects both estimates of the incumbency
advantage and the effect of spending (as estimated by Green and Krasno, 1988). Researchers,
however, cannot simply control for voter attention. The reason is that voter attention is a mediator,
and its introduction in Equation 7 can bias the estimates of the treatment variables Incumbent and
Quality (for a discussion, see Imai et al., 2011 and Acharya et al., 2016). Moreover, the same issue
also affects the estimation of the effect of Money, since candidates’ spending decisions are, at least
in part, a direct consequence of their relative reputation (Property RI.2). Hence, the estimates of
the other variables are likely misidentified by the inclusion of Money in Equation 7.
Observe that the bias induced by omitting voter attention can be corrected by an instrumental
variable approach only if the instrument is uncorrelated with candidates’ reputation and voter
19For example, one of the key contributions of Gelman and King (1990) is to use the candidate’s
past vote share as a proxy for Quality.
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attention. To illustrate the severity of these exclusion restrictions, consider candidates’ wealth,
used in Gerber (1998). Since wealth is negatively correlated with the cost of fund-raising (which in
our model is tantamount to assuming ρ1 > ρ2), our theory implies that (everything else constant)
the voter would pay more attention to the candidate with the lowest cost of fund-raising, again
leading to conflating the effects of spending and attention.
These observations indicate that the marginal effect of any determinant of electoral outcomes
which affects voter attention (such as electoral spending, candidate quality, status, or fund-raising
ability) cannot be identified without properly accounting for the mediating effect of the electorate’s
strategic choice of attention. Empirical researchers thus can only recover unbiased estimates of
‘equilibrium effects’ (which do not distinguish between direct and mediating effects) by using, for
example, plausibly exogenous changes in regulation. Recent examples include Barber (2016) and
Hall’s (2016) analysis of state-level changes in contribution limits to determine the total effect of
money in politics. By isolating the mediating effect of voter attention, our results then suggest that
exploiting variation in effectiveness of communication (e.g., by using the media congruence data
collected by Snyder and Stro¨mberg, 2010) can help to partially recover the direct effect.
Our theory has also implications for the identification of the ‘incumbency status advantage,’
which we define as the causal effect of incumbency on a politician’s electoral success. Recent works
have used regression discontinuity (RD) designs to identify this quantity. As discussed extensively in
the literature (e.g., Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Grimmer et al., 2011; Eggers et al., 2015), focusing
on close elections approximates an environment in which incumbency is randomly assigned, and thus
identifies the causal effect of incumbency on electoral outcomes. In our setting, this corresponds to
the case when φ = 0. Our analysis, however, suggests that this approach does not yield unbiased
estimates of the incumbency status advantage. Interpreting the incumbency status advantage as
higher effectiveness in communication (ρ1 > ρ2), our next result shows that the voter pays more
attention to the leading candidate who outspends his opponent.
Property RI.6. Suppose φ = 0 and ρ1 > ρ2. The voter pays more attention to the leading candidate
1 and candidate 1 incurs higher campaign expenditures than candidate 2.
Property RI.6 shows that even if RD designs fully parse out quality differences between incum-
bents and challengers (φ = 0), these estimates necessarily capture both the direct effect of the
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incumbency status advantage (ρ1 > ρ2) and the mediating effects of greater attention and spending
by the leading candidate. Hence, the direct causal effect of incumbency cannot be identified solely
with an RD design.20
4.3 Reputational imbalance and political selection
To conclude our analysis of reputational imbalance, we now look at its consequences for voter wel-
fare. A common theme in the literature is that competitive elections are a sign of good democratic
performance, at least in a common value environment.21 Our framework suggests that this claim
needs to be qualified. Reputational imbalance decreases the competitiveness of the election (Prop-
erty RI.3), but has a positive effect on the performance of the electoral process, as measured by the
probability a congruent politician is elected. A similar result obtains when we look at the effect of
greater communication effectiveness.
Property RI.7. (i) When ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ, the probability a congruent politician is elected strictly
increases with candidates’ communication effectiveness
(ii) The probability that a congruent politician is elected strictly increases with reputational imbal-
ance.
Property RI.7.i implies that an increase in communication effectiveness improves the voter’s
ability to detect congruent politicians. While intuitive, it provides a novel rationale for the negative
relationship uncovered in Snyder and Stro¨mberg (2010) between media congruence (arguably a
proxy for communication effectiveness) and the probability that a legislator votes with her/his
party.
Property RI.7.ii is more subtle. Recall that our definition of reputational imbalance implies that
the average quality of candidates is unaffected by the underlying level of reputational imbalances
20This issue worsens whenever the empirical strategy does not properly parse out quality differ-
ences (i.e., φ > 0) either because researchers do not properly approximate the 50 − 50 threshold
(see Hyytinen et al., 2017 for empirical evidence) or the electorate holds systematically different
opinions of incumbents and challengers at the threshold (Eggers, 2017; Fowler, 2017).
21When candidates can campaign on common good or divisive issues, others have shown that
higher degree of electoral competition can harm the electorate (e.g., Lizzeri and Persico, 2005).
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(q1 + q2 = 1). Nonetheless, reputational imbalance (φ) strictly improves voter welfare (which
is proportional to the probability a congruent candidate is elected). To understand this result,
observe that voter attention is only valuable when a congruent candidate faces a party loyalist.
When it comes to the leading candidate 1, this probability is q1(1 − q2) =
(
1+φ
2
)2
. It is increasing
and convex in the level of reputational imbalance. When it comes to the trailing candidate 2, the
probability of the pivotal event is q2(1 − q1) =
(
1−φ
2
)2
. It is decreasing and convex in the level
of imbalance; hence, it does not decrease too fast. Because the voter conditions her attention on
particular electoral races, the increase in the likelihood of detecting a congruent candidate 1 more
than compensates for the decrease for candidate 2.22
Our theoretical framework can also be used to identify the welfare consequences of the in-
cumbency status advantage. This quantity has long concerned political scientists, owing to its
interpretation as evidence of an “unfair advantage” in electoral races (e.g., Fiorina, 1977). Suppose
that in an open race both candidates have the same communication effectiveness (ρ1 = ρ2 := ρ
o),
whereas incumbency implies that the leading candidate1’s communication effectiveness—denoted
ρi1—is greater than 2’s—denoted ρ
i
2. The next property shows that even if the incumbency status
advantage reduces average effectiveness, it can have a positive effect on the probability that the
voter elects a congruent politician (thus on her welfare).
Property RI.8. Suppose φ = 0. The incumbency status advantage strictly increases the probability
a congruent politician is elected whenever
ρi1+ρ
i
2
2
≥ ρo.
The key intuition behind this result is that the voter only cares about the congruence of the
election winner. Since the incumbency status advantage improves one candidate’s communication
effectiveness (candidate 1’s), communication is on average less likely to be wasted. Property RI.8
has no implications regarding the fairness of the incumbency status advantage. It does, however,
indicate that this advantage can be instrumentally beneficial to the electorate.
22It is important to stress that in this model voter welfare depends entirely on the quality of
selection, as there is no effort or other forms of endogenous valence, which one can reasonably
expect to go down—at least on average—as the election becomes more lopsided.
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5 The consequences of partisan imbalance
In this section, we study the effect of partisan imbalance, fixing the level of reputational imbalance
to zero (φ = 0), which implies q1 = q2 = 1/2. We also assume that ρ1 = ρ2. Observe that, in
this formulation, partisan imbalance only refers to the voter’s evaluation of party label controlling
for difference in candidates’ quality. This everything-else-equals claim is important to interpret our
results (see footnote 23 for a discussion). We first establish our main comparative statics and then
detail the welfare consequences of partisan imbalance.
5.1 Voter attention, candidate spending, and electoral outcomes
Our first three results consider how partisan imbalance affects voter’s choice of attention, campaign
spending, and electoral outcomes.
Property PI.1. The voter pays more attention to the trailing candidate 2 than to the leading
candidate 1: x∗2 − x∗1 > 0. This difference is strictly increasing with partisan imbalance.
Property PI.2. The leading candidate 1 incurs lower campaign expenditures than the trailing
candidate 2: y∗2(c)− y∗1(c) > 0. This difference is strictly increasing with partisan imbalance.
Property PI.3. The leading candidate’s (ex-ante) winning probability is strictly greater than 1/2.
However, the difference in ex-ante winning probabilities between the leading and trailing candidates
is strictly lower than δ.
Absent any additional information, the voter’s electoral decision is based on the partisan swing.
Since the partisan swing favors candidate 1, the risk of wrongly electing a loyalist candidate 1 is
higher than wrongly electing a loyalist from party 2. Consequently, the voter pays more attention
to the trailing candidate 2 (Property PI.1).
As a result of greater voter attention, the trailing candidate 2 has greater incentive to incur
campaign expenditures. Unlike reputational imbalance, candidates’ marginal benefit from campaign
expenditures depends directly on partisan imbalance (see Equation 3 and Equation 4 when δ > 0).
With partisan imbalance, a congruent candidate 1’s electoral chances are high even in the absence of
successful communication. His marginal benefit from spending is thus low. In contrast, candidate 2’s
chances are more critically linked to successful communication. His marginal benefit from spending
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is thus high. As a result, the leading candidate’s campaign expenditures are always lower than his
opponent’s (Property PI.2 and Figure 5a).23
Overall, partisan imbalance always generates an electoral advantage for the leading candidate 1
(his ex-ante winning probability is strictly greater than 1/2). However, since the trailing candidate
2 outspends his opponent and the voter pays more attention to candidate 2 (she is thus more likely
to learn candidate 2’s type), the difference in (ex-ante) winning probabilities is always smaller than
the underlying level of partisan imbalance (δ). This is the mitigating effect of electoral campaigns.
This result is illustrated in Figure 5 where the leading candidate’s equilibrium ex-ante winning
probability (solid dark line) is below the winning probability absent the mitigating effect (dashed
purple line).
The analysis of the consequences of partisan imbalance suggests an important dimension of
heterogeneity in the data. Ceteris paribus (that is, in the absence of reputational imbalance and
asymmetries in communication effectiveness or fund-raising ability), (i) campaign expenditures
should be negatively correlated with partisan imbalance (Property PI.2), and (ii) voters should
know more about the trailing candidate than about the leading candidate (Properties PI.1 and
PI.2).
Further, Property PI.3 implies that the electoral consequences of changing the partisan compo-
sition of a single electoral district are limited (assuming it has only marginal effect on the pool of
candidates). This conclusion is consistent with the empirically documented small aggregate impact
of partisan redistricting—arguably, a major source of partisan imbalance (Grofman, 1990; Gu¨l and
23Recall that we are abstracting from asymmetries in communication effectiveness (ρ1 = ρ2) and
reputation (q1 = q2). These assumptions play an important role in determining attention and
spending levels in Properties PI.1 and PI.2. When ρ1 > ρ2 or/and q1 > q2, the leading candidate 1
outspends his opponent and receives more attention for some strictly positive δ’s. The comparative
statics, however, continue to hold. Spending by and voter attention towards the trailing candidate
(resp. the leading candidate) increase (resp. decrease) with δ (see the Appendix). This also implies
that our results would hold even if partisan imbalance affected both the voter’s evaluation of party
1 (pi1) and of candidate 1 (q1), as long as pi1 increases with partisan imbalance sufficiently fast
compared to q1.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium with partisan imbalance
The solid dark (dashed blue) line corresponds to the leading (trailing) candidate’s equilibrium expenditures (Figure
5a) and ex-ante winning probability (Figure 5b). In Figure 5b, the dark solid line corresponds to the leading
candidate’s ex-ante equilibrium winning probability; the dashed purple line corresponds to the leading candidate’s
ex-ante winning probability absent the mitigating effect of campaign. Parameter values: ξ = 3/4, λ = 3.
Pesendorfer, 2010)—on electoral outcomes (Gelman and King, 1994; Niemi and Abramowitz, 1994).
Gelman and King argue that this moderate effect is due to the uncertainty associated with the redis-
tricting process. Our paper provides an alternative explanation based on voter’s strategic response
to partisan imbalance. This theoretical contribution generates a novel and testable district-level
predictions: increasing a district’s share of Republican voters by 1% should result in an increase in
the Republican candidate’s vote share of strictly less than 1%.
5.2 Partisan imbalance and political selection
Partisan imbalance reduces the competitiveness of an election (Property PI.3). Under the commonly
held belief that competition is necessary for good democratic performance, one should expect a
negative effect on voter welfare. Our next result shows that this claim again needs to be qualified.
Property PI.4. The probability that a congruent candidate is elected increases with partisan im-
balance.
An increase in partisan imbalance has two first-order effects on campaign spending: it decreases
the leading candidate’s expenditures and increases the trailing candidate’s. This, in turn, generates
two second-order effects: (i) the leading candidate 1’s marginal benefit of campaign expenditures
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increases (there is a greater chance that electoral communication—rather than the partisan swing—
determines the outcome of the election) and (ii) the trailing candidate’s marginal benefit of campaign
expenditures increases as well, due to the reduction in his opponent’s spending. Consequently, the
leading candidate’s campaign spending is less responsive to partisan imbalance than the trailing
candidate’s, and the voter is on average more likely to detect congruent candidates.
Property PI.4 implies that partisan redistricting does not necessarily harm the electorate. Mov-
ing to a more neutral process (as advocated by several organizations, e.g. Redrawing the Lines)
might have negative unintended consequences depending on the initial level of reputational imbal-
ance and communication effectiveness. While not arguing against non-partisan redistricting, this
paper shows that the effect of such policy should be carefully evaluated.
6 Combining reputational and partisan imbalances
The previous sections analyze reputational and partisan imbalances separately. Here, we briefly
discuss the joint consequences of both imbalances.
In the Appendix, we show that electoral campaigns mitigate the effect of partisan imbalance
even in the presence of reputational imbalance. As a consequence, the probability that the voter
detects a congruent candidate 1 is lower with partisan imbalance than without. If one interprets
the voter’s ex-post evaluation of a candidate as his ‘personal’ vote share (i.e., the vote share not
caused by partisan imbalance), our theory predicts that 1’s personal vote decreases with partisan
imbalance. However, the leading candidate’s winning probability increases with partisan imbalance
(Property RI.3 holds in this setting). These two results, which point at an important dimension
of heterogeneity in the effect of incumbency, are consistent with Ansolabehere et al.’s (2000) main
findings.
Our analysis also highlights how the two types of imbalance, while having a similar effect on
the electoral process, operate through theoretically distinct channels. The beneficial effect of rep-
utational imbalance is primarily driven by voter attention (the upward change in her attention
towards the leading candidate dominates her reduction in attention towards the trailing candidate),
whereas the positive impact of partisan imbalance mainly operates via candidates’ behavior (can-
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didate 1’s spending is less responsive than candidate 2’s). Consequently, both imbalances have a
complementary beneficial effect on the probability the voter elects a congruent politician.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a unified theoretical framework to study the consequences of reputational and
partisan imbalances. Our theory helps organize and explain several empirical regularities such as the
existence of an incumbency spending advantage and the observed heterogeneity in an incumbent’s
winning probability and personal vote. It also provides a rationale for the previously unexplained
difference between the significant electoral premium associated with better reputation and the
limited benefit of partisan imbalance. Our results also suggest novel testable empirical predictions
regarding the effect of redistricting, the size of the incumbency advantage in different campaign
environments, or candidates’ campaign spending as a function of partisan imbalance.
These various empirical patterns, we show, are primarily driven by voters’ strategic choice
of attention. While a few recent papers (e.g., Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2014; Prato
and Wolton, 2016a) have criticized the behavioral political science literature for understating the
impact of candidates’ behavior on voters’ attitude, this paper shows that the criticism goes both
ways. Voters do not simply cast a vote. The electorate’s attention to campaign messages has a
stronger impact on candidates’ behavior than previously recognized. This conclusion has critical
consequences for empirical analysis of key determinants of electoral outcomes (e.g., candidates’
quality) since any resulting estimate is likely to suffer from severe omitted variable bias. Moreover,
voter attention can be a powerful mechanism behind various recent estimates of the incumbency
advantage, the incumbency status advantage, as well as the effect of campaign spending.
Our theoretical framework also serves to reassess the normative claim that competitive elections
are necessary for the good functioning of democracy. While reducing electoral competitiveness,
electoral imbalances have a positive effect on political selection. In our setting, more competition
does not always benefit the electorate.
Our theory assumes a common value policy and unmediated communication between candidates
and the electorate. Future research would do well to study the performance of the electoral process
27
in ideological domains and to account for the important role of the media when voters face significant
cognitive constraints.
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